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AGI and reflexivity 
 
Pascal Faudemay1 
 
 
Abstract. We define a property of intelligent systems, 
which we call Reflexivity. In human beings it is one aspect 
of consciousness, and an element of deliberation.  
 
We propose a conjecture, that this property is conditioned 
by a topological property of the processes which 
implement this reflexivity. These processes may be 
symbolic, or non symbolic e.g. connexionnist. An 
architecture which implements reflexivity may be based 
on the interaction of one or several modules of deep 
learning, which may be specialized or not, and 
interconnected in a relevant way. A necessary condition of 
reflexivity is the existence of recurrence in its processes, 
we will examine in which cases this condition may be 
sufficient. 
 
We will then examine how this topology will make 
possible the expression of a second property, the 
deliberation. In a final paragraph, we propose an 
evaluation of intelligent systems, based on the fulfillment 
of all or some of these properties. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Focusing on high-level functions 
 
The goal of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is to 
model human intelligence (or at first time intelligence of 
superior animals), and to make available in a computer 
system the capabilities of a human being. AGI differ in this 
way from Specialized Artificial Intelligence, which targets 
more limited application domains [6, 11, 13]. 
 
An AGI may also designate a prototype of an Artificial 
General Intelligence, more or less close to the goals of this 
field [4, 12, 35]. It may also be a seed AGI (or Baby AGI), 
with a limited initial knowledge but a good learning 
capability [30, 31, 40]. 
 
Among the functions of human mind, we consider 
“superior” functions, including goals management, 
attention, emotions, inference and analogy, conceptual 
blending, deliberation. Some of them are mainly 
unconscious, such as attention and part of inference. 
Others are part of consciousness, like deliberation. 
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1.2. An axiomatic approach 
 
We propose an axiomatic approach, and therefore it should 
be as simple as possible. However, let’s notice that we do 
not consider the topic of consciousness as a whole, but 
only an aspect, which we shall call reflexivity. 
 
Definition 1. 
The reflexivity of a cognitive process will be defined as the 
fact for this process, to be a function of the previous states 
of the same process, and of its present and previous 
perceptions, actions and emotions.  
 
If the previous states which are considered begin at the 
origin of life of the system, we shall say that this reflexivity 
is unlimited, and if these states begin at the origin of the 
considered data system, we shall say that this reflexivity is 
infinite. 
 
The reference to emotions is explained at paragraph 4.1. 
 
Definition 2. 
Deliberation is the production of a flow of sentences in a 
natural or artificial language (or of tuples which represent 
sentences, or of lists of concepts), by a reflexive system in 
which these sentences are part of the future cognitive 
processes. 
 
We first present in a more systematic way reflexivity and 
deliberation, then we show how the implementation of 
reflexivity implies recurrence. We then discuss which 
modalities of recurrence guarantee reflexivity, and at 
which conditions. The recurrence phenomenon may be 
observed with a partially or entirely non symbolic 
architecture, but also with an architecture based on the 
management of symbolic data (sentences or tuples). We 
also propose some aspects of the recurrent management of 
deliberation. A last paragraph concludes on the limits of 
reflexivity as a function of the complexity of the 
underlying architecture, and proposes an evaluation 
scheme for reflexive and deliberative AGIs. 
 
2. REFLEXIVITY. 
 
An intelligent system implemented by a neural network 
[19] is reflexive if it has the following properties: 
 
St  = H(Wt-1, P, E, A, St-1)           (1) 
Kt  = F( Wo, P, E, A, S).             (2) 
Wt = G(Wt-1, P, E, A, S).             (3) 
 
And the following one: 
 
Sj=0, t+1 = T(Sj=jmax, t, P, E, A).  (4) 
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W, P, E, A, S, K, are matrices : 
 
P  (perceptions) 
W (synaptic weights) 
A (bias or activation thresholds) 
S  (states of neurons) 
K (actions of the system) 
E (emotions) 
 
These matrices have the following dimensions: 
• Time  t=0 to i 
• Layers j=0 to jmax 
• Neurons k=0 to kmax(j) in layer j 
• For weights w, the index of targets neurons  k’=0 
to k’max(j+1) 
 
We shall note Wo as a weights matrix at time t=0, j the 
index of a neurons layer, jmax  the index of the upmost 
neurons layer (which is projected by recurrence on layer 
j=0), k the index of a neuron in layer j.  
 
When j=0 then Sj, = P and when j=p then K= Sj 
Therefore (2) is directly derived from (1). (3) does not 
seem to be a direct condition of reflexivity. 
 
Equation (1) and (4) define a topology of the neural 
network, or of a symbolic system with comparable 
properties.  
 
Here by topology we mean a set of properties which can 
be expressed as properties of a related graph. 
 
The properties displayed  by equations (1) to (4)  define 
the network as a recurrent neural network (RNN) [19, 21]. 
However, these conditions (or equivalent ones) are 
probably not  sufficient. 
 
<page> 
  <title>Antichrist</title> 
  <id>865</id> 
  <revision> 
    <id>15900676</id> 
    <timestamp>2002-08-
03T18:14:12Z</timestamp> 
    <contributor> 
      <username>Paris</username> 
      <id>23</id> 
    </contributor> 
    <minor /> 
    <comment>Automated 
conversion</comment> 
    <text 
xml:space="preserve">#REDIRECT 
[[Christianity]]</text> 
  </revision> 
</page> 
 
Fig. 1. XML produced by a RNN. (Andrej Karpathy, 2015, 
[19]). 
Our project is to reach the definition of sufficient 
conditions for the implementation of reflexivity in a 
neuron network. This does not forbid its implementation 
with a symbolic architecture, possibly with an equivalent 
topology. 
 
With suitably chosen parameters, and a relevant network 
topology and size, it is possible to teach a neuron network 
how to invent XML structures, random but realistic  
Wikipedia pages, etc. Figure 3 displays an example 
proposed by Karpathy, of an XML file produced by such 
a system.  
 
This example shows the capability of the deep RNN (i.e. a 
RNN with many layers, typically 20 to 150 [21]) to learn 
both the grammar of an XML structure, and the semantic 
or the vocabulary of a specific field. Let's remember that 
data are input character by character, and that the system 
has no prior knowledge of XML or the utilized language. 
 
3. DELIBERATION 
 
Deliberation is the fact for the system to infer sentences 
based on the ones which it has already produced by 
reflexive processes, to produce such sentences and to 
decide which sentences among them, it can output towards 
the external world. 
 
Thus it is a level of meta-inference, which can be 
implemented by a deep learning system, or by a symbolic 
process, e.g. derived from one of the existing pre-AGI 
projects [6, 13]. 
 
We will assume that the deliberation is done by a neuronal 
subsystem, referenced as B, which receives as input the 
productions of the previously defined reflexive system, 
named A. The system will produces as an output a flow of 
sentences (or more generally files) or actions, by which it 
communicates with its environment. 
 
In Figure 2 (below) we have : 
 
IN the input unit, of one character (one byte, or possibly 
two bytes if we want to allow complex Unicode 
characters) 
a0….a n: a 1D systolic vector 
A and B: two recurrent neuron networks, where the output 
layer is projected on the input layer. 
K1 to Kn output units, with actions L1 to Lj, and the 
sentence Lj+1 to Ln. This device (or part of it) can possibly 
be a 1D systolic vector. 
OUTPUT output character of network B, and/ or a Boolean 
which can control the output character from device A. 
 
We do not represent the register stack which may manage 
a short term memory for unit A input or output, and 
possibly also two other register stacks for unit B, under the 
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control of dedicated actions from these two units. The 
access of a neural network to external memories is subject 
to active research, which we briefly mention in paragraph 
4.14. These external memories do not necessarily need to 
be limited to a register stack [18, 20, 42]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Communication between subsystems A and B.  
 
In order for process B to be effective, it must have the same 
knowledge of the outside world as the reflexive system A, 
and be itself a reflexive system. It must also have one or 
more supplementary neuron layers, connected to a single 
decision neuron (or to a group of neurons with majority 
decision), which will produce the result <OUTPUT> or 
<DON’T OUTPUT>. It may also directly produce one or 
several sentences of its internal dialogue. 
 
For this purpose, one solution is that system B would have 
an initial configuration equivalent to that of system A, and 
would learn from the outside world in an identical way as 
A. We shall leave to further research to know whether B 
must, or must not, be identical to A. 
 
Let us notice that the B unit processing time implies a 
minimum delay of at least m steps between output K by 
unit A, and the same output by the system. We will have  
 
m = n + jmax’ (5)   
 
where n is the number of input bytes needed by unit B to 
decide, and jmax’ is the number of layers of unit B. As B 
is a recurrent network, the effective number of steps for its 
decision is variable. A step duration is the number of 
instructions (or of cycles) needed by a layer to process its 
inputs.  
 
4. MODALITIES  
 
4.1.  Emotions. 
 
In human beings as well as in animals, emotions are 
conscious states which are accompanied by a sensation, 
notably of pleasure or displeasure, and which have an 
effect on memorization. Emotions have a degree or an 
intensity. Perceptions and states of consciousness which 
are accompanied by a more intense emotion, are more 
memorized than those accompanied by a less intense 
emotion [9, 24,  26]. 
 
These consciousness states are the result or the cause of 
the presence in brain of neurotransmitters or 
neuromediators. Lövheim [22] proposes a representation 
of emotions by a cube, as a function of the presence or 
absence of three neuromediators, dopamin, noradrenalin 
and serotonin, which have a specially important role. 
However, there would be a thousand chemical substances 
at the synaptic junction, and at least one hundred of them 
would be neurotransmitters or neuromediators [37]. 
 
As an example, we can add to those which are cited by 
Lövheim, endorphins, cannabinoïds and ocytocin. 
Endorphins modulate pain and well-being, cannabinoïds 
act on serenity and the sensation of paranoïa (belief in 
others hostility), ocytocin regulates attachment and 
indifference. 
 
We speak about human or animal emotions. Indeed, the 
neuromediators which are present in humans are also  
present in mammals, and fear or even anxiety can also be 
observed, even in drosophila [10]. 
 
It is important to simulate emotions in an intelligent 
system, first as a modulator of memorization. A human 
being without emotions is also at risk of becoming a 
psychopath. We cannot exclude that a similar phenomenon 
might appear in artificial intelligence. As human or 
animals emotions are a powerful modulator of decisions, 
their absence may lead to inappropriate ones.  Last, the 
presence of emotions in an intelligent system may 
facilitate its communication with human beings. 
 
This does not necessarily imply that all human or animal 
emotions should be found in a robot or in an intelligent 
system. Deciding which are the relevant or minimal 
emotions for such a system, is outside the scope of this 
paper. 
 
In an intelligent system an emotion  ete with index e (which 
characterizes the type of emotion) at time t, can be seen as 
an environment variable defined as the sum of the outputs 
of neurons of index e, of layers 1 to j, or in a simpler way 
as the state of neuron of index e  in layer jmax. It will be 
 
RNN A
 
RNN B
Input
Yes/ No or Output' 
Output
1D systolic array (optional)
a1 an
K1 Kn
IN
K'1 K'n
x1 or n bytes
x1 or n bytes
AND 
+delay  
m 
steps
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used as the bias of a collection of neurons from various 
layers. 
 
Emotion  Ee  activates a collection of Ee-dependent 
neurons, which have a non-null input weight for their 
connection with neuron of index e. A neuron may be 
dependent on several emotions, which can either lower or 
increase its bias, and therefore have an action of inhibition 
or activation  of this neuron. 
 
The system of emotions can also include some coupling 
between different emotions, some of them may reinforce 
or inhibit other ones. This is implemented by the 
production of emotions by a subset of the neuronal 
network. Any neuron can contribute to the production of 
some emotion (or of its mediators), and can also produce 
several emotions. Last, it is possible to introduce some 
inertia in the emotions, so that it would not change too fast. 
 
It is also possible to associate each emotion with a sense 
of “pleasure”, which will activate a process of continuation 
of this emotion, or a sense of “displeasure”, which will 
activate a process to end this emotion. These processes 
may be a simple positive or negative reinforcement on 
appropriate layers, or a predefined procedural resource, 
possibly modified by an evolutionary program. 
 
These emotions may also be input into the system by an 
outside agent (the designer or an user), or be deduced from 
the activation of some concepts in the neural network. 
 
4.2. Cognitive areas, action on bias. 
 
Several subsets of neurons are characterized by their bias, 
i.e. by an activation threshold which is a function of the 
level of one or several emotions [26]. In each of these 
subsets, which we call a cognitive area, the bias is equal 
for all the neurons of the subset, or at least, it depends on 
a same function of the emotions. 
 
E.g. in a cognitive area associated with the attachment 
towards a person or a human group, all neurons will have 
a bias which will be a function of this attachment. The 
other properties of cognitive areas, will be discussed 
shortly in the paragraph about the system initialization. 
 
4.3. Research and approximate 
inference, blending 
 
This property is implicit in a system based on a neuronal 
architecture, which can easily implement associative 
retrieval and approximate inference. However, our 
proposal may also apply to a symbolic architecture. 
 
For examples of approximate inference and of blending in 
symbolic or partially symbolic architectures, the reader 
may refer to the works of projects like NARS or OpenCog 
[12, 36]. 
 
The interest of a neuronal approach for AGI is underlined 
by the works of Schmidhuber [32]. 
 
4.4. Goals management 
 
We introduce here the notion of an autonomous system. 
 
Definition 3.  
An autonomous reflexive system is a reflexive system with 
a set of actions, which depend on a system of goals. 
 
We shall notice that the property of deliberation may not 
be mandatory in a non-reflexive autonomous system, e.g. 
In the case of an autonomous car. However, we only 
consider here reflexive and deliberative systems. 
 
The definition of a goals system for an AGI is a complex 
task. According to Yudkowsky and others, it is very 
difficult to define them in a non ambigüous way. There 
would often be a risk that the system would escape the 
control of its designer, as people do not necessarily 
understand the reasoning which can be made by an 
intelligent system, either when it is implemented with a 
neuronal architecture, or even with a symbolic one [5, 7, 
15, 38, 39]. 
 
In a very interesting approach, Joscha Bach [3, 4] proposes 
to derive at any time the goals of an AGI from a set of 
needs, which include the needs of existence (access to 
calculation means, energy, cooling,…), social needs 
(communication with third parties, either human or not,..) 
and epistemic needs (acquisition of new knowledge). The 
insufficient satisfaction of a need creates a goal, which can 
be more or less prioritary. 
 
The MicroPsi system created by Bach is based on the Psi 
theory proposed by Dietrich Dörner [3]. This theory may 
enable AGI designers to escape to the various problems of 
a direct goals definition [39]. 
 
4.5. Attention 
 
Attention [16] is a property which enables the system to 
focus its perceptions on some part of the perception field, 
or to focus inference on part of the sentences or concepts 
produced by the system. E.g., if the system has a vision 
capability, with some part in high definition, and some part 
in low definition, the informations of the low definition 
part will enable the system to focus the high definition part 
within the vision field [27]. 
 
An example of this property is given by Andrej Karpathy 
[19], for the access to hand-written characters which are 
spread on a page, by using a convolutive neural network 
with a size which is independent of the size of the page. 
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Attention may also exist for a system which operates on 
texts, e.g. belonging to a texts database. It may then make  
actions such as right or left move in the text, text read, 
move from one document to the another one, etc. The text 
database can also be more generally considered as a tree, 
with operators to move within this tree. 
 
This property will then be represented by a set of actions, 
which will be learned by the neural network in the same 
way as other actions. A small number of attention 
properties may also be implemented as “innate 
properties”, e.g, in a procedural way, before starting the 
system 
 
4.6. Perceptions estimation 
 
We define : 
Pt,1..p the p elementary perceptions at time t, they may be 
pixels (r, g, b) in a matrix representing an image, or 
characters in a text, or phonemes in an audio flux, etc. 
 
Let then be Pt+2jmax, p+1..2p the estimations of these 
perceptions at time t+2jmax, where jmax is the number of 
layers both in encoder and in decoder part of the network.  
 
In each recurrent unit A and B, there are two blocks of 
layers, one of them acts as an encoder which outputs a 
series of possible actions K, the next ones acts as a decoder 
which estimate the next state of perceptions. The 
difference between estimated and real perceptions can 
produce an increase in attention, or various emotions 
(surprise, interest, etc..). These effects are now well known 
for human beings. 
 
In a simplified version of the system layers p+jmax+1  to  
p+2jmax do not exist, Pt+2jmax is replaced by a subset of 
Sjmax. 
 
We assume that the system learns by gradient retro-
propagation or any other learning method, which is done 
from jmax to 1 for the encoder part, and from 2jmax to 
jmax+1 for the decoder part, if it exists. For this part, the 
Wt weights are modified as a function of the difference 
between the predicted and observed perceptions. 
 
4.7. Models of others and of itself 
 
We assume that the system encodes an internal discourse, 
composed of trees of sentences, as trees of tuples, where a 
sentence can be represented by several tuples. In these 
tuples, either by construction or by learning, there is a field 
or attribute which designates the author of the sentence (or 
the assumption which it represents) and attributes of place 
and time or duration. 
 
An author designation may be done explicitly by the user 
or by a teacher of the system, through dedicated inputs, or 
be learned by the system, through the input discourse. It 
should be the same for place and time information. These 
author or hypotheses information will also be used to build 
models of the various partners of the system. These models 
will propose an assumed behavior of these partners, in the 
context of one or several concepts. A concept is a class of 
situations or  a set of sentences or a class of words. 
 
A specific author represents the system. Its model enables 
it to make inferences on its own behavior or concepts. An 
assumption may of course have an author (or a class of 
authors), which may be the system itself. 
 
We will notice the importance of images of the self and of 
others, and of emotions, in the learning of the outside 
world by an intelligent system. These images (or models) 
can make possible an imprinting mechanism, by which the 
system will adopt the values and concepts of its designer, 
or of a teacher who plays a privileged role in its 
development. The adoption of the values of a predefined 
group, may also play a role in this sense. 
 
We may consider that if there had been an imprinting 
mechanism or an image of third parties in Tay, the 
intelligent system experimented by Microsoft on Twitter, 
this system would have identified the discourse of hostile 
third parties or of people with values opposed to those of 
its group or designers, and would have limited it to these 
third parties [33]. 
 
4.8. Spatial representation 
 
Ideally, the system should be able to spot the presence of 
an agent or any object on one or several maps, at various 
scales, and recognize which objects are situated in various 
neighborhoods of itself. Map management operators 
should then be available. These operators could thus 
manage interfaces with external memory, which would 
hold these maps. 
 
However in a first step it seems possible to manage this 
issue through the representation of inclusion relationships 
of an object in another one, as the system will have a 
known capability to process trees. 
 
4.9. Time representation 
 
Many different representations of time may be present in 
texts, such as relative ones “before this event”, “the day 
before”, or imaginary times “once upon a time”, or 
different time scales “one millisecond after the Big Bang”. 
 
The time may be represented by a scale of time, and by a 
number, which represents the distance to an origin of time, 
and by a duration. It is also necessary to take into account 
two distinct times : the event time, and the time of its 
recording or description. E.g., an event may relate to the 
origin of the Universe, more than 13 billion years ago, and 
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may be described in an article published in “December 
2015”. 
 
However, one issue is the representation of this notion, in 
a RNN architecture. For the moment, we don’t have fully 
resolved this point. A provisional solution is similar to that 
which we have proposed for the space representation: it is 
to represent a tree of time intervals, with operators of 
inclusion, precedence and succession. 
 
4.10.  Degree of confidence in a 
data or a property. 
 
A very important information in an AGI is the degree of 
confidence that the system may have towards a sentence, 
or a model, an assumption, a logical clause, an author, etc. 
This confidence level may itself be decomposed into 
several elements, such as the evaluation of the sentence, 
the level of confidence of this evaluation, the cardinality 
of the validation set (the number of examples), etc. 
 
As an example, some opponent I of the system will be 
characterized with certainty C, to produce declarations 
with value V, with an experimental basis X (number of 
examples). C describes the degree of knowledge that the 
designer or observer O has about I, the level of X indicates 
the plausibility of further revisions of these data. V 
describes the community or opposition of values between 
I and O. 
 
In the same way, an assumption H can be characterized by 
the triple (C, X, V). If these variables are defined, without 
loss of generality, between 0 and 1, the author of a new 
hypothesis will possibly characterize it by the triple {0.9, 
0.1, 0.7}. Her confidence in the assumption will be C= 0.9, 
the experimental basis will possibly be X= 0.1, and the 
agreement between the author and O may be V= 0.7. It will 
be possible to make some calculations on these 
coefficients, the calculations will be more or less 
approximate. 
 
In the neuronal system which we describe here, the 
confidence coefficient may be reduced to a scalar, which 
is the arc value between the input character (INPUT) and 
the entry layer of the RNN. The possibility to use a multi-
valued confidence coefficient should be the subject of 
further research. 
 
4.11. Non-monotony, Open World 
Assumption (OWA) 
 
An important property of a reflexive system is non-
monotony, which enables the calculation of clauses with 
negation. This property enables exceptions to the 
knowledge acquired by the system, or also systems of 
concepts (ontologies) with only partial coherence. 
 
This property also makes possible a progress in the system 
knowledge, by enabling detection of inconsistencies in a 
theory.. 
 
In a neuron network, the non-monotony can be 
implemented by the use of inhibitor arcs between two 
neurons, i.e. the use of negative connection weights 
(synaptic weights). This implies an adaptation of the retro-
propagation algorithm, or more generally the learning 
algorithm. 
 
The non-monotony also implies the Open World 
Assumption (OWA), i.e. the assumption that the absence 
of a clause in the knowledge base (or of a connection in 
the neural network) does not imply its negation. 
 
4.12. Multimedia perception 
 
Definition 4. 
We shall say that a system is fully reflexive if it includes 
multimedia perceptions, with an input of documents (text, 
images, page layout), visual data (still image and video), 
audio data (sounds and speech), and is able to process 
them. 
 
In the case of an embodied system (robot or autonomous 
vehicle) it will possibly include other parameters, such as 
the gps position and localization on a map. 
 
4.13. Actions and physical support 
 
Definition 5. 
We shall say that an autonomous system is complete if it is 
a reflexive and embodied system [12], able of mobility and 
with a set of actions implemented by effectors (limbs, 
mobility systems), under the control of the reflexive system. 
 
However the system will be more or less complete, 
depending on the properties of its mobility system and of 
its effectors. 
 
4.14. External interfaces 
 
The access of a neuron network, possibly recurrent, to 
external memory (and more generally to external 
interfaces) is the subject of recent work. These interfaces 
may enable an access to sets of registers, stacks, or random 
access memory [18, 20, 42]. The access can also be 
implemented in an associative way, by one or several 
keywords produced by the system. 
 
We assume that the external documents accessed by the 
system can be memorized in an external memory, and that 
the system can access it by one of these methods to answer 
a user query.  
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5. ARCHITECTURE 
 
The architecture of the intelligent system which we 
consider here, will be characterized by a first level of n 
memorization cells, making a 1D systolic network, in 
which the user will input a character at a time. This 
network will possibly be connected to a stack of N 
registers of n characters each. The operations on this stack 
will be a subset of the actions of the system. 
 
The n cells of the first layer will be connected to jmax 
layers of h(j) neurons each, forming a recurrent network. 
The output of layer jmax will include first, the k actions of 
the system, and secondly, an output of c characters. Both 
elements will form the retroaction loop of the system, and 
will be connected to its entry layer, beside the sentence 
contained in the first n memorization cells. 
 
The coupling of this unit with another equivalent recurrent 
unit, according to the schema of paragraph 3, is intended 
to enable a degree of deliberation. It will be the subject of 
further experimentation. 
 
6. INITIALIZATIONS 
 
The initialization will be made by the choice of a global 
architecture among the few variants presented before, and 
of the meta-parameters such as the number of neurons per 
layer, the number of neurons per layer and cognitive area, 
the projections between cognitive areas, the initial 
synaptic weights. The functions which will return the bias 
depending on the level of the various emotions, will also 
be part of initializations. 
 
We shall assume that when the list of connections will be 
defined, the initial weights will be drawn according to a 
simple law, which remains to be defined. 
 
It is possible to evolve  these meta-parameters, through the 
use of an evolutionary program. However, this leads to two 
issues: 
 
First the choice of a success criterium of a set of 
parameters, such a criterium is needed to guide the 
evolution program. It can be the number of iterations 
needed to reach some quality of results, as measured by 
subjective indices. These results may also be used to 
measure the quality of the reflexivity, as we propose it in 
paragraph 8. 
 
Secondly, Eliezer Yudkowsky stresses the risk, if an AGI 
is defined by an evolutionary program, that it would escape 
to the control of its designers [38, 39]. This risk should be 
carefully contained. 
 
A solution may be in a first time, to reserve these 
evolutionary programs to system versions containing 
relatively few neurons (e.g. less than 100 k, or possibly 
even less than 10 k), and therefore for which the risk of 
escape would appear neglectible. This remains to be 
worked out. 
 
As an example, a system with 30 to 50 k neurons has a 
comparable size to the brain (or equivalent neural system) 
of an  insect with a limited complexity, such as the fly. 
Even if the functions of neurons in an AGI of comparable 
cardinality are very different from those of a fly, the 
considered risk would probably remain very low. It might 
not be the case for cardinalities about or above one million 
neurons, comparable to very evolved insects like the honey 
bee, which can recognize faces and have complex social 
behavior [14, 28]. 
 
7. EXPERIMENTATION  
 
An implementation of the system in Python is scheduled 
for the next months, it will use Theano libraries. It should 
be first implemented on an OS X environment, with 
relatively low processing power, then in a CUDA or 
OpenCL environment on a Mac Pro, with a D700 graphic 
board (more than 4000 GPU cores). 
 
However the possibility of implementing part of the initial 
development and experimentation on Ubuntu, is also 
considered as an alternative solution. 
 
The goal of experimentation will be to work out a system 
which should be able to learn from Wikipedia and text 
bases available on the Internet, and to participate to a 
process of Queries & Answers. The system should learn 
the concepts and values associated with several authors, 
and will be able to take them into account to evaluate 
queries and answers. We believe that this accounting of the 
model of discussion partners is essential for a mastered 
learning of the outside world. 
 
8. REFLEXIVITY EVALUATION. 
 
We believe that the proposed architecture is a minimal one 
to obtain a perceivable degree of reflexivity. Let us 
remember that our goal is not to realize a “conscious” 
system, but to simulate some properties of the cognitive 
systems of human beings and of some superior animals 
(primates, mammals, some birds…), or maybe of some 
simpler animals (drosophila, honeybee) [10, 14, 28]. 
 
We propose the following conjectures: 
 
Conjecture 1. 
 
A necessary condition for a neuron network to implement 
a reflexive system is that it should possess the properties 
described in paragraph 2. 
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Conjecture 2. 
 
A sufficient condition for an AGI to be a complete reflexive 
autonomous system is that it would possess all the 
properties described in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4.1 to 4.14. 
 
We shall distinguish complete reflexive autonomous 
systems (r-complete systems), and complete deliberative 
autonomous systems (d-complete systems). A conjecture 
2-b applies to d-complete systems. 
 
Let’s notice that an AGI can be a complete reflexive 
system without being an autonomous one. We should also 
stress the fact that, in our opinion, the condition of 
conjecture 2 is sufficient, but not necessary. We will have 
to refine the analysis and the experimentation in order to 
reach necessary and sufficient conditions. 
 
We will provide a reflexivity index, which will evaluate 
the satisfaction of conditions from paragraphs 2 to 4.14, in 
order to determine to which degree an intelligent system is 
reflexive. The exact composition of the reflexivity index 
will be the subject of further papers. 
 
Conjecture 3. 
The properties of a complete reflexive AGI, or a complete 
autonomous one, can be obtained either with a neuronal 
system, or with a partially or fully symbolic system. 
 
Let us notice that it seems easier to implement a system 
according to the conditions of paragraphs 2 to 4.14 with a 
neuronal system (e.g. to implement non-monotony, fuzzy 
inference, etc.), but that the interest of a symbolic system 
is that it could be understandable by users, which is not 
necessarily the case with neuronal systems. 
 
An index of the properties of an intelligent system may 
aggregate coefficients describing each dimension of an 
AGI, such as presented in paragraphs 2 to 4.14. E.g. each 
coefficient may be comprised between 0 and 1, and the 
global coefficient may be a product of these partial 
coefficients, or the sum of their logarithms, plus some 
constant. The basic properties of reflexivity and 
deliberation may however have larger weights.  
 
A second complementary index may be the cardinality of 
the neurons set of the upper layer (or the upper layer of the 
encoder part), or some function of this cardinality. 
 
It will be possible to validate this approach by comparing 
these coefficients with the result of subjective evaluations 
[23], e.g. a Turing test, applied to a relatively dense system 
(in terms of number of neurons and of connections per 
neuron), after a learning phase, which may be based on a 
subset of the Wikipedia pages.  
 
 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have proposed several conjectures on the 
properties that should be those of a neuron network, or 
possibly of a symbolic architecture, to implement a 
reflexive and deliberative system, and possibly a reflexive 
and autonomous system. 
 
In the next months we intend to experiment a neuronal 
architecture which will display these properties. The 
neuronal network which will be implemented will not 
exceed the cardinality of the neural system of a drosophila, 
or possibly of a honeybee, i.e. cardinalities between 30 k 
and one million of neurons, and a number of weights 
between 30 million and 10 billion, or more probably not 
greater than one billion weights. 
 
However, with an appropriate topology, this system should 
be applicable to problems which interest people, such as 
the summarization of Wikipedia pages or the participation 
to a query and answers system. 
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